THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OF PUBLIC HOUSING BASED  ON MULTI-OBJECTIVE MATCHING: A CASE STUDY OF  HUANGSHI CITY by Wu, Yan et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
PACIS 2014 Proceedings Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems(PACIS)
2014
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OF PUBLIC
HOUSING BASED ON MULTI-OBJECTIVE
MATCHING: A CASE STUDY OF
HUANGSHI CITY
Yan Wu
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, wuyan1117@foxmail.com
Jinlong Zhang
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, prozhangjl@gmail.com
Huimin Ma
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, huimin_ma@mail.hust.edu.cn
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2014
This material is brought to you by the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been
accepted for inclusion in PACIS 2014 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Wu, Yan; Zhang, Jinlong; and Ma, Huimin, "THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OF PUBLIC HOUSING BASED ON MULTI-
OBJECTIVE MATCHING: A CASE STUDY OF HUANGSHI CITY" (2014). PACIS 2014 Proceedings. 181.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/pacis2014/181
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OF PUBLIC HOUSING BASED 
ON MULTI-OBJECTIVE MATCHING: A CASE STUDY OF 
HUANGSHI CITY 
Yan Wu, College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 
China, wuyan1117@foxmail.com 
Huimin Ma, College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 
Wuhan, China, huimin_ma@mail.hust.edu.cn 
Jinlong Zhang, College of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 
Wuhan, China, prozhangjl@gmail.com 
Abstract 
The rapid rate of China’s urbanization in recent years arises greater demand of houses. To ease the 
housing shortage, Chinese authority has been building or collecting a large amount of public housing. 
However, as the large-scale construction of public housing has been promoted, an increasing number 
of people focus their eyes on the equitable distribution of these houses. This paper aims to establish a 
distribution system of public housing with the research in Huangshi City (a city in central China). We 
affirm the importance of priority and housing preference of applicant families, on the basis of which 
we discuss operating principle of the distribution system based on the multi-objective programming, 
and advance two ways of model solutions as well. At last, we propose an algorithm instance to verify 
feasibility of the distribution system, and make the comparison between two types of algorithms as well.  
Keywords: Public housing, housing preference, distribution system, multi-objective programming
1 INTRODUCTION 
During the ongoing urbanization process in China, housing problem has become one of the major social 
issues we have to face. China’s urbanization rate rose from 17.9% in 1978 to 53.7% in 2013(National 
Bureau of Statistics), and the influx of the rural population arouses larger demand of housing. In 
addition, housing situation is severe of urban residents. Rising housing prices has weakened the 
purchasing power of low-income families. Consequently, Chinese authorities devote greater efforts to 
the implementation of housing indemnification. And an increasing number of people focus their 
attention on the distribution of public housing as its large-scale construction has been promoted. 
However, nearly half of public housing are of illegal use or idle in eight provinces and sixteen 
cities(annual audit report, 2010). Therefore, how to allocate public housing scientifically and rationally 
seems an urgent problem that calls for prompt solutions.  
The large scale of urbanization also promotes the transformation of industrial cities in China, resulting 
in increasingly prominent housing problems. We choose Huangshi, an old industrial base in central 
China, as a representative city for our study on distribution system of public housing. The system 
realizes the automatic matching scientifically by computer algorithms, taking priorities and housing 
preferences of applicant families into account. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars have examined the allocation issues extensively. Some of them studied factors influencing the 
allocation in public housing, like education attainment, current residence status and family size(Huang 
& Clark, 2002; Pan, 2004; Li & Li, 2006). Zhang and Rasiah(2014) also summarized the evaluating 
system of housing allocation that was adopted by H Air-Conditioner Plant. Chen et al. (2014) made a 
detailed description from housing application of security groups to the housing allocation progress in 
China. And they emphasized the waiting list and periodic lottery operation when the demand of public 
housing exceeded the supply.  
Problems existing in the allocation process also caused intense discussion between scholars. Fan and 
Zhang(2014) considered on main problems in public housing management in China including the 
equitable distribution problem. They point out that housing distribution mainly relies on a random way, 
which causes new unfairness. On the basis, they also put forward several allocation principles to 
standardize such progress. Daniel and Hunt(2014) doubted the fairness of the site-and-services scheme 
of housing allocation in Nigeria. They believed that the allocation processes based on need and demand 
was an effective way, whose use in developing countries was advocated also(Monk & Grant, 2011).  
Most of the previous studies payed more attention on the whole mechanism of housing indemnification, 
and researches considering about the distribution were scarcely studied from a quantitative way. 
Therefore, this study is to fill this gap and construct a distribution system which is suitable for China.  
3 DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING 
Currently, the distribution methods of public housing widely used in China are “Waiting” and “Luck”. 
The “Luck” process is full of randomness that rarely considers actual needs of applicants. This is quite 
unfair for particularly difficult families only relying on their fortune. What’s more, a large number of 
time, manpower and material resources will be taken in the whole process. To better carry out the 
housing indemnification, Chinese government has to consider the application of public housing 
distribution system.  
What’s the critical points that should be focused on in the distribution system? That is equity and 
efficiency. Equity refers to that all applicants should be assigned to houses they satisfied with, but this 
cannot be achieved in reality. Thus, here we define equity as the priority, which determined by both 
basic information and application time of applicants. For example, the priority of a disabled applicant 
will be higher than normal ones as other things being equal. Efficiency has two meanings: effective and 
fast. Each applicant has his/her own preferences for housing, and they will be more satisfied if more 
housing attributes matching their preference, which we define as matching degree. And matching 
degree reflects the effectiveness of the distribution. Moreover, the distribution system implementing 
with computer algorithm ensures the distribution velocity.  
4 OPERATING PRINCIPLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
4.1 Selecting Matching Indexes 
To assign appropriate public housing to the right applicants, selecting suitable matching indexes is a 
crucial issue. Namely, applicants’ preferences for houses must be considered. Unlike basic information, 
applicants’ preference information is their demand towards housing attributes. However, more than 100 
housing attributes are given in the “Design code for residential buildings in China”, and it is impossible 
to take all these attributes into account. Fortunately the housing properties most families cared about in 
China are roughly the same, thus we want to select several attributes most talked about by the applicants.  
According to the data collecting from questionnaires distributed to the security groups and interviews 
with officers in the housing agency of Huangshi City, we summarize six significant matching indexes: 
location, living area, house rent, floor, surroundings and apartment layout. Table 1 shows the detailed 
option items of each index. 
Table 1. Matching indexes and options 
Indexes Location  Living Area House Rent Floor Surroundings Apartment layout 
Options 
district 
sub-district 
community 
15m2 above 
30m2 above 
45m2 above 
60m2 above 
75m2 above 
less than CNY100 
less than CNY200 
less than CNY300 
less than CNY400 
less than CNY500 
first floor 
low floor 
medium floor 
high floor 
top floor 
living facilities 
medical facilities 
education  
transportation 
the employment 
single room 
1 bedroom+ 1 hall 
2 bedrooms+ 1 hall 
3 bedrooms+ 1 hall 
4.2 Computing matching degree 
Let I with the number of n and J with the number of m denote sets of the security groups and public 
housing respectively. The elements of above two sets will be {I1, I2, ···, Ii, ···, In} and {J1, J2, ···, 
Jj, ···,Jm }. We also define S as the matching set, whose elements are paired from sets I and J. For 
example, one possible S set can be represented as S= {(I1, J5), (I2, J1), ···, (Ii, Jj), ···, (In, J2)}. As discussed 
previously, the matching results are based on the matching degree between applicant families and public 
housing. Here S1 (i, j), S2 (i, j), S3 (i, j), S4 (i, j) , S5 (i, j) and S6 (i, j) are labeled as the matching degree 
function of location, living area, house rent, floor, surroundings and apartment layout between applicant 
Ii and house Jj. Similarly, we also define C1i, C2i, C3i, C4i, C5i, C6i and H1j, H2j, H3j, H4j, H5j, H6j as the 
expectation of applicant family Ii and the actual value of public housing Jj for each matching index 
respectively.  
The constraints of above matching attributes can be classified into two types: hard constraint and soft 
constraint. Usually, the hard constraint is a certain condition that must be satisfied, while the soft 
constraint is an acceptable condition as long as it is within a given range.  
Location is a hard constraint but with three option items. For convenience, we let C1i1, C1i2, C1i3 represent 
expectations for district, sub-district and community, and H1j1, H1j2, H1j3 are designed to denote the real 
value for each item. Unlike normal hard constraints, S1 (i, j) equals to the highest score only if the 
expectations are fully consistent with the actual value. Here we limit the numerical range of the 
matching degree functions to [-1, 1], and the S1 (i, j) is calculated in formula (1).  
 
𝑆1(i, j) =
{
 
 
 
 
1,   𝐶𝑖1
1 = 𝐻𝑗1
1  , 𝐶𝑖2
1 = 𝐻𝑗2
1  , 𝐶𝑖3
1 = 𝐻𝑗3
1  
0.6,   𝐶𝑖1
1 = 𝐻𝑗1
1  , 𝐶𝑖2
1 = 𝐻𝑗2
1  , 𝐶𝑖3
1 ≠ 𝐻𝑗3
1  
0.2,   𝐶𝑖1
1 = 𝐻𝑗1
1  , 𝐶𝑖2
1 ≠ 𝐻𝑗2
1  , 𝐶𝑖3
1 ≠ 𝐻𝑗3
1  
−1,   𝐶𝑖1
1 ≠ 𝐻𝑗1
1  , 𝐶𝑖2
1 ≠ 𝐻𝑗2
1  , 𝐶𝑖3
1 ≠ 𝐻𝑗3
1  
     (1) 
Obviously, living area is a soft constraint, and applicant families will be more pleased with the larger 
area. Let C2i as the minimum expectation for living area and H2j as the lower limit of the actual value, 
which meansC𝑖
2, 𝐻𝑗
2 ∈ {15,30,45,60,75}. Following formula (2) shows the S2 (i, j), and max H2j is the 
value of the maximum area among all the public housing.  
 
𝑆2(i, j) =
{
 
 
 
 
  
1,    H𝑗
2 ≥ C𝑖
2 and  maxH𝑗
2
 = C𝑖
2 
H𝑗
2−C𝑖
2
maxH𝑗
2−C𝑖
2 ,   H𝑗
2 ≥ C𝑖
2 and maxH𝑗
2
 > C𝑖
2
−1,    H𝑗
2 < C𝑖
2
   (2) 
In contrast to the housing area, applicants hope the house rent be lower. Despite the lower rent means 
the relatively poor house, but for the security groups, money is one of things they concerned the most. 
Thus here we suppose they all choose the rent ceiling they can afford, and there will be an increasing 
satisfaction with lower rent. Here C𝑖
3, H𝑗
3 ∈ {15,30,45,60,75}, and min H3j refers to the minimum rental 
among all the public housing. Formula (3) presents S3 (i, j).  
𝑆3(i, j) =
{
 
 
 
 1,     H𝑗
3 ≤ C𝑖
3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 C𝑖
3 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛H𝑗
3 
 
C𝑖
3−𝐻3𝑗
C𝑖
3−𝑚𝑖𝑛H𝑗
3 ,    H𝑗
3 ≤ C𝑖
3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 C𝑖
3 > 𝑚𝑖𝑛H𝑗
3
−1,     H𝑗
3 > C𝑖
3
   (3) 
Floor can also be regarded as a hard constraint. To standardization, here we design the number 1 as the 
first floor, and the number 2,3,4,5 are the low floor, medium floor, high floor and top floor respectively. 
That is to say, C𝑖
4, 𝐻𝑗
4 ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}. Then the satisfaction will be lower when there are greater differences 
of floor height between the applicant’s expectation and the actual value of the housing. Formula (4) 
presents calculation rule of S4 (i, j). 
 
𝑆4(i, j) =
{
  
 
  
 
1,     C𝑖
4 = 𝐻𝑗
4  
0.5,    | C𝑖
4 − 𝐻𝑗
4| = 1
0,    | C𝑖
4 − 𝐻𝑗
4| = 2
−0.5,    | C𝑖
4 − 𝐻𝑗
4| = 3
−1,    | C𝑖
4 − 𝐻𝑗
4| = 4
                 (4) 
The matching degree of surroundings depends on the actual situation of living facilities, medical 
facilities, education, transportation and the employment around the house. We score each house on the 
basis of numbers of each facility within a radius of 3 km to it. And we define H5j1, H5j2, H5j3, H5j4 and 
H5j5 as the score of each item in the range of [-1, 1]. Applicant’s requirements for the surroundings vary 
from each other, thus each family can choose several options it thinks the most important. Let C5i1, C5i2, 
C5i3, C5i4 and C5i5 denote whether they select the corresponding surrounding facility. Following formula 
(5) shows the S5 (i, j).  
 
𝑆5(i, j) =
∑ C𝑖𝑘
5 ∗𝐻𝑗𝑘
55
𝑘=1
∑ C𝑖𝑘
55
𝑘=1
 ,  C𝑖1
5 , C𝑖2
5 , C𝑖3
5 , C𝑖4
5 , C𝑖5
5 ∈ {0,1}    (5)  
Security groups all want houses with more rooms, but the similarity of their preference to apartment 
layout will be relatively higher. Moreover, we should assign appropriate houses for applicants who are 
genuinely in need. As a consequence, here we consider the family structure of applicants as their 
expectation. According to the related policies of housing indemnification in Huangshi, Table 2 presents 
the suitable apartment layout for families of some common structures. All the matching pairs are 
classified into five levels, which are used to calculate the matching degree. S6 (i, j) is shown in formula 
(6) as follows.  
 
𝑆6(i, j) =
{
 
 
 
 
1,   R = "entirely appropriate"  
0.5,   R = "appropriate"
0,   R = "Just right"
−0.5,   R = "not suitable"
−1,   R = "inappropriate"
        (6) 
 
 
 
 H6j1: single room H6j2: one bedroom H6j3: two bedroom H6j4: three bedroom 
C6i1: single person entirely appropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 
C6i2: a couple Appropriate entirely appropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 
C6i3: a couple with a child 
under 10 years old 
Appropriate entirely appropriate Inappropriate Inappropriate 
C6i4: a couple with a child 
over the age of 10 
Just right Appropriate entirely appropriate Inappropriate 
C6i5: family with 3 persons not suitable Just right entirely appropriate Just right 
C6i6: family with more than 
3 persons 
not suitable Just right Appropriate entirely appropriate 
Table 2. Suitable apartment layout for families of some common structures 
4.3 Model construction 
The ultimate goal of the distribution system is to pair off n applicant families and m public housing, 
which makes everyone reasonably happy. To achieve this objective, we build a multi-objective model 
making the maximum sum of the matching degree of all the attributes in this research.  
As mentioned before, priority is another significant point apart from matching degree. According to the 
relevant regulations of housing indemnification in Huangshi City, each applicant family will obtain a 
score based on the basic information submitted after approval. Let Pi denotes the priority index of the 
applicant family Ii, the maximum and minimum of which are defined as Pmax and Pmin respectively. We 
also label Ki as the ordinal value of family Ii.  
𝐾1, 𝐾2 ,···, 𝐾𝑖 ,···, 𝐾𝑛 ∈ {1, 2,···, 𝑖,···, 𝑛} 
𝐾𝑥 ≠ 𝐾𝑦 , 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦, x, y ∈ {1, 2,···, 𝑖,···, 𝑛} 
And following formula (7) shows the Pi: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 −
𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑛−1
(𝐾𝑖 − 1), 𝑖 = 1,2,···, 𝑛        (7) 
Actually, the distribution of public housing can be simplified as an assignment problem. Here we 
introduce the variable 𝑥𝑖𝑗 to show whether Jj matches Ii or not.  
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = {
1,   𝐽𝑗  matches 𝐼𝑖
 0,   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
With the priority index and matching degree discussed previously, we construct the distribution model 
as follows. 
max 𝑓𝑘 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ∑ 𝑆𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1               (8) 
s. t.
{
 
 
 
 
 
 ∑𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
,    j = 1,2,···, m
∑𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1
𝑚
𝑗=1
,    i = 1,2,···, n
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 𝑜𝑟 0,    i = 1,2,···, n and  j = 1,2,···, m 
   
 
As a scarce resource in Huangshi, there is fewer number of public housing than that of applicant families. 
Each public house can only be assigned to one family, and one family can only obtain a house. Unlike 
other matching problems such as marriage problem (Gale & Shpaley 1962; MeVitie & Wilson 1971; 
Roth 1986), we just need to consider the sum of matching degree of applicant families on each attribute 
in the model. And the matching degree of family with higher priority index is more significant than the 
lower ones.  
A variety of solutions can be used to solve multi-objective problems. Since the ideal solution of each 
target can be easily obtained, here we try to get the optimal value from the distance between the ideal 
value and actual value of each target. We label fk* as the ideal solution of each object respectively. 
Given that all matching attributes are of equal importance for applicant families, then solving above 
multi-objective model can be transformed into solving following distance D:  
min𝐷 = (∑ |𝑓𝑘∗ − 𝑓𝑘|𝑞6𝑘=1 )
1
𝑞                 (9) 
1 ≤ q ≤ ∞  
The corresponding matching results and distance value will change with the different value of q. In this 
research, we only discuss cases q=1 and q=2, which are considered as Absolute Distance and Euclidean 
Distance.  
Above distance can be simplified as formula (10) when q=1. It is easy to know that the multi-objective 
model has been transformed into a linear assignment problem with a single target. And there are lots of 
algorithms can be used to solve such problems, such as Branch and bound method, cutting-plane method 
and so on(Hiller & Lieberman 2001). Furthermore, assignment problem can also be converted into the 
weight matching problem in the bipartite graph(Bondy & Murty 1976; West 2001). Here we think 
Kuhn-Munkras algorithm, the commonly used method in assignment problems, is suitable for solving 
problems like formula (10). 
max𝐷 = ∑ 𝑓𝑘6𝑘=1                           (10) 
In the case of q=2, the objective function can be shown in formula (11) as follows, which is a nonlinear 
assignment problem obviously.  
min𝐷 = (∑ |𝑓𝑘∗ − 𝑓𝑘|26𝑘=1 )
1
2                (11) 
And algorithms mentioned above will be no long applicant for this model. Thus, we consider the 
Genetic algorithm(Chu & Beasley 1997; Gen & Cheng 2000) here, a relatively mature approach for 
solving nonlinear problems.  
5 INSTANCE ANALYSIS  
To conduct the distribution process, we collect some real values of public housing and security group 
from Huangshi in this section. For simplicity, we set Pmax=3.2 and Pmin=1. Therefore the priority index 
of each applicant can be easily obtained. To avoid the complicated names of location in Huangshi, we 
let α1 to α3, β1 to β3, and γ1 to γ3 take the place of district, sub-district and community respectively. 
Table 3 presents the attributes value and priority index of each applicant family. And the actual value 
of matching indexes of public housing is shown in Table 4. On the basis of calculation rules discussed 
previously and data from table 3 and table 4, we can easily obtain the matching degrees of each index 
between applicants and houses. 
Applicant family C1i C2i C3i C4i C5i C6i Pi 
I1 C1i1=α1, C1i2=β2, C1i3=γ1 75 300 4 C5i3, C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i6 3.2 
I2 C1i1=α2, C1i2=β1, C1i3=γ1 60 200 3 C5i1, C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i5 3.0 
I3 C1i1=α2, C1i2=β3, C1i3=γ2 60 200 3 C5i1, C5i4 =1 C6i6 2.8 
I4 C1i1=α1, C1i2=β2, C1i3=γ3 30 200 1 C5i1, C5i2, C5i4=1 C6i2 2.6 
I5 C1i1=α3, C1i2=β1, C1i3=γ2 15 100 3 C5i1, C5i3, C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i1 2.4 
I6 C1i1=α1, C1i2=β1, C1i3=γ3 30 100 5 C5i1, C5i3, C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i3 2.2 
I7 C1i1=α1, C1i2=β2, C1i3=γ1 60 300 2 C5i2, C5i3, C5i4 =1 C6i4 2.0 
I8 C1i1=α3, C1i2=β3, C1i3=γ2 45 400 1 C5i1, C5i2, C5i3, C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i4 1.8 
I9 C1i1=α2, C1i2=β2, C1i3=γ1 30 200 4 C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i2 1.6 
I10 C1i1=α2, C1i2=β1, C1i3=γ1 30 200 4 C5i5=1 C6i2 1.4 
I11 C1i1=α3, C1i2=β1, C1i3=γ2 15 100 3 C5i1, C5i2, C5i4, C5i5=1 C6i1 1.2 
I12 C1i1=α1, C1i2=β3, C1i3=γ3 30 100 1 C5i1, C5i5=1 C6i3 1.0 
Table 3. Attributes value and priority indexes of applicant families 
 
Public housing H1j H2j H3j H4j H5j(score of C5i1, C5i2, C5i3, C5i4, C5i5) H6j 
J1 H1j1=α2, H1j2=β2, H1j3=γ1 30 300 3 0.5, -0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1 H6j2 
J2 H1j1=α1, H1j2=β2, H1j3=γ1 75 500 4 0.8, 0.6, 0.9, 0.6, 0.2 H6j4 
J3 H1j1=α1, H1j2=β1, H1j3=γ2 30 300 2 0.3, 0.7, 0.4, 0.6, 0 H6j3 
J4 H1j1=α3, H1j2=β1, H1j3=γ2 60 200 1 -0.1, 0.3, -0.5, 0.4, 0.6 H6j3 
J5 H1j1=α2, H1j2=β3, H1j3=γ1 45 300 2 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, -0.2, 0.3 H6j3 
J6 H1j1=α1, H1j2=β1, H1j3=γ2 45 200 4 0.3, 0.7, 0.4, 0.8, 0 H6j3 
J7 H1j1=α3, H1j2=β3, H1j3=γ1 75 400 3 -0.4, 0.2, 0, -0.7, 0.6 H6j4 
J8 H1j1=α2, H1j2=β1, H1j3=γ2 15 100 3 -0.3, 0.8, 1, 0.2, 0.6 H6j1 
J9 H1j1=α1, H1j2=β3, H1j3=γ2 30 400 5 0.6, 0.6, 0.5, 0.9, -0.2 H6j2 
J10 H1j1=α1, H1j2=β1, H1j3=γ1 30 300 1 0.5, 0.7, 0.4, 1, 0.1 H6j3 
J11 H1j1=α2, H1j2=β1, H1j3=γ2 60 300 4 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, -0.2, 0.3 H6j3 
J12 H1j1=α3, H1j2=β3, H1j3=γ1 45 200 2 -0.4, 0.2, 0, -0.3, 0.6 H6j2 
Table 4. Actual value of matching indexes of public housing 
Since there is no unique result when using the genetic algorithm, we let the algorithm continuously run 
15 times and choose the optimal one. The ultimate matching results through two cases mentioned above 
are shown in Table 5,whose distance value are both calculated from formula (11). Table 6 provides the 
ideal point values of each target when q=2, which are obtained by the Kuhn-Munkras algorithm. Two 
matching results in Table 6 demonstrate different characteristics of two algorithms. We find out that 
priority index plays an important role in the case of q=1, and the overall matching degree is just a linear 
average of each attributes’, which may appear inappropriate results like (I11, J7). However, the matching 
results under the circumstance of q=2 are much better than ones under q=1 despite it has a larger 
distance value. Thus, we believe that the case of q=2 is more suitable for the distribution system here. 
Matching results q=1 q=2 
S 
(I1, J2) (I1, J2) 
 (I2, J11) (I2, J7) 
(I3, J5) (I3, J5) 
(I4, J12) (I4, J9) 
(I5, J8) (I5, J3) 
(I6, J9) (I6, J6) 
(I7, J3) (I7, J4) 
(I8, J4) (I8, J12) 
(I9, J1) (I9, J1) 
(I10, J6) (I10, J11) 
(I11, J7) (I11, J10) 
(I12, J10) (I12, J8) 
Distance value 17.68 27.83 
Table 5. Matching results under two cases 
 
fk* f1* f2* f3* f4* f5* f6* 
value 15.68 8.40 -4.40 24.10 13.06 18 
Table 6. Ideal point value of each target when q=2 
6 CONCLUSION 
A distribution system for equitable assignment of public housing was put forward in this article. And 
its operating principle was focused on here as well. After carrying out the research in Huangshi City, 
six critical attributes the applicants concerned the most were summed up: location, living area, house 
rent, floor, surroundings and apartment layout. Then this study designed the calculation rules of 
matching degree of each attribute between applicants and houses, on the basis of which a multi-
objective assignment model was constructed for solving this problem. And its specific solutions were 
explored in two cases. Finally, the matching results in the instance validated rationality and feasibility 
of the system. This article tried to find out an effective way for the automatic allocation of public 
housing. However the operation principle suitable for Huangshi City may not be applicable for other 
cities in China, which should be considered in the further research.   
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